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FEDERAL CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS.
"Inasmuch as practically all the important corporations of the
present time are engaged in interstate commerce, and as the United
States has the right to fix conditions to this license to engage in inter-
state commerce, this system would enable the Federal Government to
reform the present condition of corporate business in all its important
features."
In these words Mr. Garfield, Commissioner of Corporations, states
the object of his proposal that every corporation shall be required to
obtain a Federal license before engaging in interstate commerce. It
'is not to regulate interstate commerce, but to regulate "all the import-
ant corporations" doing business in the United States.
This object not being within the lawful field of Federal action,
legislation to this end would be unjustifiable; but yet the courts
could hardly declare it void. Although unconstitutional, it would
probably stand as valid, beyond the reach of constiutional law,
because the motives of Congress are not to be made the subject of
judicial inquiry, but are presumed to be in accord with the constitu-
tion. No Congressman may, under his oath, vote for any bill, unless
in his judgment it is called for to effect some purpose within the
domain of Federal action; yet a bill not intended for any such
purpose, but appearing to relate to a subject within that domain, may
become a law safe from judicial attack. This fact is too little recog-
nized. It is generally thought that a law is necessarily justified by
the constitution, unless it is of such a character that the Supreme
Court should declare it void. It is not commonly appreciated that
while constitutional law, administered by the courts, is our great safe-
guard against unconstitutional action by Congress, it is not all-
sufficient.
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To say that the purpose of this proposal is not to regulate interstate
commerce but to regulate "all the important corporations," is not to
criticise Mr. Garfield personally. He has not in this struck out upon
a new path. During the two years or so of consideration which
preceded the passage of the Anti-Trust Act of 189o, the evident
purpose of those who advocated some such legislation-and hardly
any one in Congress ventured to oppose-was to destroy or curb
combinations of capital without discrimination as to whether they
operated in one state only or in more than one. The relation to
interstate or foreign commerce was thought of only as giving a basis
of jurisdiction. Except for the limitations upon the power of Con-
gress, the trade or commerce referred to in that act would have been
unlimited. The limitation was made, not because the purpose was
limited, but in order to keep within the jurisdiction of Congress.
Mr. Knox, in his Pittsburg address in October, 19o2, came near to
the suggestion of Mr. Garfield when he said: "It seems reasonable
to say that it (Congress) can, in the exercise of this power (to regu-
late interstate commerce) deny to a combination whose life it cannot
reach the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce except upon
such terms as Congress might prescribe to protect that commerce
from restraint." The messages and speeches of President Roose-
velt show, in regard to anti-trust legislation, that in his mind the aim
is to reach the large corporations and to regulate them, not specially
in matters affecting interstate and foreign commerce, but generally
as to their outside dealings and their internal affairs, for the protec-
tion not only of the public, but also of those who are or may become
their creditors or stockholders.
That it is not the real purpose of Mr. Garfield's scheme to regulate
interstate commerce, is made reasonably clear by the fact that it
affects only corporations as distinguished from unincorporated com-
panies, partnerships and individuals. If a partnership in the grocery
business in Portchester sells or buys across the state line in Connecti-
cut, no license is required. But if the partnership is changed into a
corporation, with the same persons interested and. employed and with
the same capital, a license must be taken. So far as interstate com-
merce is concerned, there is no change involved. Business goes on
substantially as before. Possibly the change is known to but few.
Is there any conceivable reason why the mere incorporation of those
who are doing the business shall call for Federal interference under
the power to regulate interstate commerce? Suppose that an associa-
tion is organized having a large capital and intending to do a large
business in two or more states. It may or may not be incorporated.
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According as it is or is not, a license is or is not required. Is there
any r~ason in this? How many persons know whether the business
of John Wanamaker is done by a corporation, a firm or an individual?
And what difference does it make as regards interstate commerce or
any public interest? Does the difference give any reasonable basis
for differentiation as to whether a license shall or shall not be re-
quired for interstate commerce? Clearly, if the purpose were to
regulate interstate commerce, a license would be required from an
unincorporated association, a partnership or an individual, as
well as from a corporation. Will it be proposed to make the law
apply to unincorporated joint stock companies? A stop cannot
logically be made there. An unincorporated joint stock company
is a partnership. The difference between such a company and an
ordinary partnership does not concern the public. It involves no
difference of power as to commerce. Then the law should be
extended to partnerships. And why stop there? -Why should a
license be required to enable two men in partnership to buy and sell
across a state line and not to enable one of them alone to do so?
Shall the law then be extended to individuals? Then the New
Hampshire farmer will be barred from crossing the Connecticut
River to sell his butter, his eggs or his hay in Vermont, unless he
shall have taken a license from the Federal government and put
himself under the supervision of its Commissioner.
That the law is to apply to all corporations, big and little, is, per-
haps, further evidence that what it is sought to affect is corporate
organization and management rather than interstate commerce;
although possibly the truer view is, that, the purpose being to
regulate only "the important corporations", it was seen to be neces-
sary to include all corporations, lest this purpose might be made
so clear that the courts could see it, and, seeing it, might declare the
law void.
But doubtless there are some who are quite content that, under
the cloak of a constitutional power, Congress should legislate for a
purpose outside of its jurisdiction, if they think that Federal jurisdic-
tion ought to cover such a purpose; and who will consider only the
question, Is it reasonable and desirable that the Federal jurisdiction
be extended to cover the purpose of this scheme?
It is important, then, to understand how much it is proposed to
bring within the domain of Federal action. From the sentence
quoted above it appears to be the intention "to reform the present
condition of corporate business in all its important features." The
business of most stock corporations-all except the few which con-
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fine their operations to a single state-is to be reformed "in all its
important features." That this phrase is not carelessly used, but
means what it seems to mean, is shown by the context. In the next
preceding paragraph (Report, p. 45), it is said: "Congress would
grant to corporations that meet the proper conditions power to engage
in interstate commerce; would fix the conditions under which their
business should be done in such manner as to remedy the present
defects in the state corporation law * * * " And immediately
before that is a statement of the principal features of the plan, sub-
stantially as follows: Prohibition of corporations from engaging in
interstate commerce without a Federal franchise or license (with
protection to those having such franchise or license) ; imposition of
"requirements as to corporate organization and management as a
condition precedent to the grant of such franchise or license"; "re-
quirement of such reports and returns as may be desired as a condi-
tion of the retention of such franchise or license," and "the right to
refuse or withdraw such franchise or license in case of violation of
law, with appropriate right of judicial appeal to prevent the abuse
of power by the administrative officer." The scope of the intended
reform is further indicated by the preceding statements as to evils to
be cured (Report, pp. 35 et seq.), especially the following: "Under
present industrial conditions, secrecy and dishonesty in promotion,
over-capitalization, unfair discrimination by means of transportation
and other rebates, unfair and predatory competition, secrecy of cor-
porate administration and misleading or dishonest financial state-
ments, are generally recognized as the principal evils." It is intended
that a corporation applying for a license shall undo what has been
done, so far as may be ndcessary to make its organization, capitaliza-
tion, etc., conform to principles laid down by Congress. This re-
quirement is proposed on page 6o of the Report: "That corporations
taking a Federal license should conform the status of their capital
stock, bonds and indebtedness to principles laid down by the act."
See also the query on page 62: "Can the necessary reorganization of
corporations be accomplished under all the state laws?" By the
imposition of conditions on the grant and continuance of the license
to engage in interstate commerce, Congress is to reform corporate
business "in all its important features"-as to organization, as to
capitalization and indebtedness, as to publicity in respect to organ-
ization and promotion, as to management and the responsibility of
directors, as to methods of competing for trade and other methods of
business, as to making known business and financial conditions, for
the benefit of the public and of the stockholders. Under this plan,
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the field of Federal regulation is nearly co-extensive with the present
field of State legislation as to corporations. At the outset, perhaps,
the only penalty of disregard of Congressional regulations may be
loss of privilege of doing interstate business. That is a severe pen-
alty. But if the law, in this shape, shall be accepted as constitutional,
it will probably not be long before Congress will make its regulations
more general and prescribe other penalties, with the final result that
substantially all legislative jurisdiction (and to a large extent judicial
jurisdiction as well), as to all stock corporations, except a small
-number of unimportant ones, will be taken from the states and
vested in the Federal Government.
Are we ready so to increase the powers of the Federal Government
and diminish the powers of the states? To use the words of Mr.
Garfield in speaking of the alternative plan of Federal incorporation,
which seem to be equally applicable to the license plan, are we ready
to make such a "tremendous change toward centralization"? To
state the question is to answer it, unless we are willing to bid farewell
to the fundamental theory of the Federal Constitution and to call the
wisdom of the Fathers folly whefi applied to the conditions of to-day.
And if, notwithstanding this, we must seriously entertain the pro-
posal, may we not reasonably ask that the Commissioner of Cor-
porations shall first report what amendments to the Constitution will
be necessary to subject Congress, after such transfer of jurisdiction,
to those constitutional limitations which are now operative only as
against the states, such as the prohibition against laws impairing the
obligations of contracts and the prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
The fact that the scheme involves "a tremendous change towards
centralization," at least calls for a very careful examination of the
reasons advanced in its favor. Though the constitutional objection
be put aside, the evils sought to be cured must be found to be real
and important and other adequate remedies must be undiscoverable,
if assent is to be given to so radical a change. It must at least appear
that there are definite evils springing from incorporation, curable by
legislative remedies which the states cannot or will not apply, and that
such remedies will do more good than harm.
Diagnosis is the first requisite. The evils must be found before
remedies are considered.
There are evils peculiar to the business of transportation. As to
interstate transportation, Congress has full power of regulation. In
legislating -under this power, Congress deals with that business; its
regulations act upon corporations and natural persons as well. That
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such regulations specially affect railroad companies, is not because
they are incorporated, but because they are engaged in such business.
If Congress wishes to regulate express transportation, its power is no
greater as to the business of the Wells Fargo Express Company,
which is incorporated, than as to that of the Adams Express Com-
pany, which is not. The basis of jurisdiction is the business done
and not the character of those who do it. The evils connected with
transportation should be dealt with by themselves. They give no
basis for Federal control of corporations generally.
Attention may therefore be confined to industrial corporations. If
the proposed scheme can be justified, it must be because of evils
springing from the business and dealings of such companies. And
it is quite evidlent that Mr. Garfield had such companies especially in
mind in making his proposal.
Among the evils enumerated in the report is over-capitalization.
Doubtless the views of the Commissioner are in harmony with those
of Mr. Knox expressed in his Pittsburg address in October, 19o2,
reported by him to the Senate in January, 19o3. Mr. Knox calls
over-capitalization the chief of the noxious features of trusts "and
the source from which the minor ones flow;" And he defines it as
follows: "Over-capitalization does not mean large capitalization or
capitalization adequate for the greatest undertakings. It is the
imposition upon an undertaking of a liability without a corresponding
asset to represent it." Obviously he uses the word "liability" in the
broad sense which includes the so-called liability arising from the
issue of stock. When, for example, property worth $5,000 is repre-
sented by $ioooo of stock or property worth $50,ooo,ooo is repre-
sented by $iooooo,ooo of stock, there is over-capitalization, the evil
named as the chief of "the noxious features of trusts" and the source
of the minor ones.
Over-capitalization is an evil. But its seriousness is exaggerated.
It is usually foolish; it is harmful in ways not generally appreciated;
but it is not the sturdy criminal which it appears to the popular imag-
ination. Reference may again be made to Mr. Knox's address. He
describes the evil of over-capitalization as follows: "Therefore
[that is, because it imposes upon an undertaking a liability Without a
corresponding asset to represent it], over-capitalization is a fraud
upon those who contribute the real capital, either originally or by
purchase, and the efforts to realize dividends thereon from opera-
tions is a fraudulent imposition of a burden upon the public." He
seems to find an injury to those who become participants in corporate
enterprises, and an injury to the outside public..
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Is there any substance in the suggestion of this outside injury? In
effect, it is said that a company having a million of assets will make
greater efforts for profits, if it has issued two million of stock to
represent such assets than if it has issued only one million; or, in
other words, that corporate energy is increased or decreased by
raising or lowering the nominal capital representing a given amount
of assets. Is this one of the things which experience teaches? Do
not corporations do their best to make profits without regard to the
amount of their capitalization? And is there any diminution of effort
when the assets have grown very largely in excess of the capital,
as in the case of the Standard Oil Company? Over-capitalization,
of course, does not increase the power to make profits. The power
of a corporation in the business world, so far as it depends upon
capital, depends upon actual capital, upon its real assets, not upon
its nominal capital. Calling a penny a dollar will not increase its
purchasing power in the market.
Mr. Knox says that over-capitalization is "a fraud upon those who
contribute the real capital, either originally or by purchase ;" that is,
where the capitalization is in stock only, those who take stock from
the company or those who buy stock after issue. This evil-if it be
* assumed that over-capitalization by itself may work fraud-affects
only those who become participants in corporate enterprises. Other
evils enumerated by Mr. Garfield are secrecy and dishonesty in pro-
motion, secrecy of corporate administration and misleading or dis-
honest financial statements; like evils are described by Mr. Knox as
lack of publicity of operation and insufficient personal responsibility
of officers and directors for corporate management. These evils-
and the evil of over-capitalization, if it be assumed to open the door
to fraud upon purchasers of stock-relate chiefly, if not exclusively,
to the interests of those who are or would become interested in cor-
porations as holders of their stocks or obligations. Remedies are
called for, if at all, for the protection of investors or speculators in
corporate securities. Secrecy and dishonesty in promotion, secrecy
in administration, and misleading financial statements work wrong
in inducing purchases of corporate securities. Publicity is desired
that those who buy such securities may know what they buy. Re-
sponsibility of officers and directors is essential to the protection of
corporate creditors and stockholders. All these evils relate to those
who may be called the insiders, those who are interested in the
profits to be made and in the application of such profits, those who
are the ieal owners of the corporate assets. Doubtless, there are such
evils, just as there are evils in horse trading and in every business in
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which men engage. But do these evils call for Federal interference?
If remedies beyond those open by common law or by existing statutes
are needed, cannot the states supply them? And is there any reason
for presuming that they will not do so? Fraud in sales is essentially
the same, whether the sales are -of horses or of stocks; whether of
stocks of companies operating in one state or of companies engaged
in interstate commerce. And sales of one kind or another are not
often interstate transactions. With respect to sales made in this
state, whether at private sale or on the exchange, and whatever is
sold, the Legislature of this state has ample power to enact any
needed remedies for fraud. As to corporate management and the
responsibility of officers and directors, it is a common but mistaken
notion, that New Jersey, for example, sends its corporations out to
do business in other states under lax regulations, and that such other
states are powerless to impose proper restraints. This is a mistaken
notion, because there is no such laxity in the New Jersey law and
because a state is not powerless with respect to foreign corporations.
It may exclude them, or it may admit them upon such conditions as it
may impose. The power and willingness of the states to provide
remedies with respect to the management of foreign corporations and
responsibility therefor, is indicated by the law of New York, which
requires annual reports from foreign and domestic companies and
which imposes upon the officers and directors of foreign and domestic
companies alike liabilities for making unauthorized dividends, unau-
thorized indebtedness, unlawful loans to stockholders, false certifi-
cates, etc. (Sec. 6, Stock Corporation Law). There is plenty of
assertion of the need of Federal interference, but it in no way appears,
with relation to the evils already mentioned, that the states cannot or
will not apply any needed remedies. If there is any need of Federal
interference, it must be because of other evils.
The evils above-mentioned are not those which the early octopus
hunters were after. They regarded the trusts as bad because of
their power; because of the injury which by use of such power they
would do to outsiders; because they could and would drive smaller
competitors out of business, and having got rid of competition, injure
consumers by raising prices. President Cleveland expressed this
thought in his message of December 3, 1888, when he said: "As we
view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover the evidence
of trusts, combinations and monopolies, while the citizen is struggling
far in the rear or is trampled to death beneath an iron heel." A year
later President Harrison, raising the question of restraining the
trusts, said: "When organized, as they often are, to crth out all
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healthy competition and to monopolize the production or sale of an
article of commerce and general necessity, they are dangerous con-
spiracies against the public good, and should be made the subject of
prohibitory and even penal legislation." And accordingly prohibit-
ory and penal legislation was enacted by the passage of the Anti-
Trust Act of 189o. Here was shown no concern for those who might
wish to become interested in trusts, no desire to make it perfectly safe
to come in and share in their profits. The trusts were treated as in
themselves criminal and purchasers of trust securities were regarded
as Participes criminis. No change of attitude appears in the messages
of President Cleveland or President McKinley. A new departure
was taken by President Roosevelt in his message of December 3,
19o1. Realizing that large industrial combinations were needed,
especially in view of international competition, and should not be
destroyed or prohibited, he points out over-capitalization as one of
the chief evils connected with them, not then going so far as Mr.
Knox went a year later, when he called this the chief evil and the
source of the minor evils of trusts, but naming no other specific evil;
he insists that corporations, permitted to invite capital from the
public should do so upon truthful representations as to the value of
the property in which the capital is to be invested; and suggests pub-
licity as "the only sure remedy which we can invoke."
It is submitted that the evils of over-capitalization, fraud in promo-
tion, deceit in financial statements, dishonesty in corporate manage-
ment, or any other evils touching those who are or would become
participants in industrial combinations, are completely remediable by
state legislation and afford no reason for Federal control. If Federal
control is to be justified, it must be because of evils relating to compe-
tition, the evils which were vaguely in mind when the Anti-Trust Act
of 189 was passed.
The Garfield report mentions "unfair and predatory competition"
as an evil-the only evil there specified not already considered. Is
this an evil which can be cured by legislation? Are we prepared to
define, for purposes of legal restraint, what is unfair in the strife of
business, to say distinctly how far competition may go? It will not
do to enact simply that competitors shall be fair or that they shall
be kind and good to one another, or to turn the Golden Rule into a
statute as to traders; even if such enactment is coupled with a scheme
which shall tie all who engage in business to the apron strings of a
commissioner who shall from day to day pass judgment on their con-
duct. The purpose of the Anti-Trust Act of 1890, as found by the
courts, is grounded in a desire to keep competition free, to prevent
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what may restrain competition. If it is now suggested that competi-
tion be restrained by law, should not the suggestion be accompanied
with a clear statement of the proposed restraint? just why the re-
straint should be limited to corporations, does not appear. Is there
no unfair competition in business not done under corporate organiza-
tion? But if it is to be so limited, should we be asked to approve the
scheme of taking corporations under the charge of the Government in
order to prevent unfair competition, without being told what rule of
conduct in this respect it is the purpose of the scheme to enforce?
The scheme of Federal control is but a means; the end is not
revealed.
Mr. Knox in his Pittsburg address, in his list of evils, mentions
"discrimination in prices to destroy competition." This is more
definite. But are the American people willing to contemplate gov-
ernmental interference with the right of an individual to buy or not
to buy, to sell or not to sell what he owns, and, if he sells, to fix his
own prices and terms? If one individual has this right, two in part-
nership have the same, and so have five persons or more who are
associated together in corporate organization. As to railroad rates,
the duty of uniformity is based upon the fact that railroad companies
exercise powers and perform duties belonging to the state. But the
Garfield proposal relates especially to corporations which exercise
no such powers and perform no such duties. Their property is not
charged with any trust in favor of the public-save such as looks to
the protection of creditors-any more than the property of partner-
ships and individuals. If the state is to regulate the prices at which
persons, incorporated or unincorporated, may sell what they own,
competition will be killed in the effort to make it fair and business as
now conducted must necessarily cease. If we are to go so far toward
socialism, why should we stop here? Here again may we not ask for
a definite statement of the proposed regulations? Here again the
end should be revealed before we are asked to approve the means.
If there is any evil curable by legislation in the great power of large
aggregations-which was the idea which led to the Anti-Trust Act of
i89o-manifestly the legislative remedy should not take in all cor-
porations big and little-this would be to adopt the method of Herod
without excuse-but only those whose power is up to such a stand-
ard as may be set; and on the other hand it should take in aggrega-
tions effected otherwise than through corporate organization. Dur-
ing all the years of agitation on this subject no one has yet been able
to suggest any definite limitation upon the combination of capital
which could reasonably be enacted. The possibility of any such
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limitation, however, need not be considered in connection with the
Garfield proposal, for the speeches and messages of President Roose-
velt, the address of Mr. Knox, and the Garfield report all recognize
the necessity of aggregations of capital "adequate for the greatest
undertakings," and show that it is no part of the present purpose to
prohibit the formation or continuance of such aggregations. They
are recognized as part of the necessary machinery of modem business
competition, especially of international competition.
Where, then, is the justification for this scheme, which is unconsti-
tutional in its purpose, involves "a tremendous change towards cin-
tralization," and substitutes an advanced paternalism for liberty-
which is, in short, a long step toward Federal socialism?
Thomas Thacher.
